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Abstract
We introduce a new sample complexity measure, which we refer to as split-sample growth
rate. For any hypothesis H and for any sample S of size m, the split-sample growth rate
τˆH(m) counts how many different hypotheses can empirical risk minimization output on any
sub-sample of S of size m/2. We show that the expected generalization error is upper bounded
by O
(√
log(τˆH(2m))
m
)
. Our result is enabled by a strengthening of the Rademacher complexity
analysis of the expected generalization error. We show that this sample complexity measure,
greatly simplifies the analysis of the sample complexity of optimal auction design, for many
auction classes studied in the literature. Their sample complexity can be derived solely by
noticing that in these auction classes, ERM on any sample or sub-sample will pick parameters
that are equal to one of the points in the sample.
1 Introduction
We look at the sample complexity of optimal auctions. We consider the case of m items, and n
bidders. Each bidder has a value function vi drawn independently from a distribution Di and we
denote with D the joint distribution.
We assume we are given a sample set S = {v1, . . . ,vm}, of m valuation vectors, where each
vt ∼ D. Let H denote the class of all dominant strategy truthful single item auctions (i.e. auctions
where no player has incentive to report anything else other than his true value to the auction,
independent of what other players do). Moreover, let
r(h,v) =
n∑
i=1
phi (v) (1)
where phi (·) is the payment function of mechanism h, and r(h,v) is the revenue of mechanism h on
valuation vector v. Finally, let
RD(h) = Ev∼D [r(h,v)] (2)
be the expected revenue of mechanism h under the true distribution of values D.
Given a sample S of size m, we want to compute a dominant strategy truthful mechanism hS ,
such that:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h)− ǫ(m) (3)
where ǫ(m) → 0 as m → ∞. We refer to ǫ(m) as the expected generalization error. Moreover, we
define the sample complexity of an auction class as:
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Definition 1 (Sample Complexity of Auction Class). The (additive error) sample complexity of an
auction class H and a class of distributions D, for an accuracy target ǫ is defined as the smallest
number of samples m(ǫ), such that for any m ≥ m(ǫ):
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h) − ǫ (4)
We might also be interested in a multiplcative error sample complexity, i.e.
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ (1− ǫ) sup
h∈H
RD(h) (5)
The latter is exactly the notion that is used in [2, 3]. If one assumes that the optimal revenue
on the distribution is lower bounded by some constant quantity, then an additive error implies a
multiplicative error. For instance, if one assumes that player values are bounded away from zero
with significant probability, then that implies a lower bound on revenue. Such assumptions for
instance, are made in the work of [7]. We will focus on additive error in this work.
We will also be interested in proving high probability guarantees, i.e. with probability 1− δ:
RD(hS) ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h) − ǫ(m, δ) (6)
where for any δ, ǫ(m, δ) → 0 as m→∞.
Related work. The seminal work of [9] gave a recipe for designing the optimal truthful auction
when the distribution over bidder valuations is completely known to the auctioneer. Recent work,
starting from [2], addresses the question of how to design optimal auctions when having access only
to samples of values from the bidders. We refer the reader to [3] for an overview of the existing
results in the literature. [2, 7, 8, 1] give bounds on the sample complexity of optimal auctions
without computational efficiency, while recent work has also focused on getting computationally
efficient learning bounds [3, 11, 4].
This work solely focuses on sample complexity and not computational efficiency and thus is
more related to [2, 7, 8, 1]. The latter work, uses tools from supervised learning, such as pseudo-
dimension [10] (a variant of VC dimension for real-valued functions), compression bounds [6] and
Rademacher complexity [10, 12] to bound the sample complexity of simple auction classes. Our
work introduces a new measure of sample complexity, which is a strengthening the Rademacher
complexity analysis and hence could also be of independent interest outside the scope of the sample
complexity of optimal auctions. Moreover, for the case of auctions, this measure greatly simplifies
the analysis of their sample complexity in many cases.
2 Generalization Error via the Split-Sample Growth Rate
We turn to the general PAC learning framework, and we give generalization guarantees in terms of
a new notion of complexity of a hypothesis space H, which we denote as split-sample growth rate.
Consider an arbitrary hypothesis space H and an arbitrary data space Z, and suppose we are
given a set S of m samples {z1, . . . , zm}, where each zt is drawn i.i.d. from some distribution D on
Z. We are interested in maximizing some reward function r : H × Z → [0, 1], in expectation over
distribution D. In particular, denote with RD(h) = Ez∼D [r(h, z)].
We will look at the Expected Reward Maximization algorithm on S, with some fixed tie-breaking
rule. Specifically, if we let
RS(h) =
1
m
m∑
t=1
r(h, zt) (7)
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then ERM is defined as:
hS = arg sup
h∈H
RS(h) (8)
where ties are broken based on some pre-defined manner.
We define the notion of a split-sample hypothesis space:
Definition 2 (Split-Sample Hypothesis Space). For any sample S, let HˆS, denote the set of all
hypothesis hT output by the ERM algorithm (with the pre-defined tie-breaking rule), on any subset
T ⊂ S, of size ⌈|S|/2⌉, i.e.:
HˆS = {hT : T ⊂ S, |T | = ⌈|S|/2⌉} (9)
Based on the split-sample hypothesis space, we also define the split-sample growth rate of a
hypothesis space H at value m, as the largest possible size of HˆS for any set S of size m.
Definition 3 (Split-Sample Growth Rate). The split-sample growth rate of a hypothesis H and an
ERM process for H, is defined as:
τˆH(m) = sup
S:|S|=m
|HˆS | (10)
We first show that the generalization error is upper bounded by the Rademacher complexity eval-
uated on the split-sample hypothesis space of the union of two samples of size m. The Rademacher
complexity R(S,H) of a sample S of size m and a hypothesis space H is defined as:
R(S,H) = Eσ
[
sup
h∈H
2
m
∑
zt∈S
σt · r(h, zt)
]
(11)
where σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) and each σt is an independent binary random variable taking values {−1, 1},
each with equal probability.
Lemma 1. For any hypothesis space H, and any fixed ERM process, we have:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h)− ES,S′
[
R(S, HˆS∪S′)
]
, (12)
where S and S′ are two independent samples of some size m.
Proof. Let h∗ be the optimal hypothesis for distribution D. First we re-write the left hand side, by
adding and subtracting the expected empirical reward:
ES [RD(hS)] = ES [RS(hS)]− ES [RS(hS)−RD(hS)]
≥ ES [RS(h∗)]− ES [RS(hS)−RD(hS)] (hS maximizes empirical reward)
= RD(h∗)− ES [RS(hS)−RD(hS)] (h∗ is independent of S)
Thus it suffices to upper bound the second quantity in the above equation.
Since RD(h) = ES′ [RS′(h)] for a fresh sample S
′ of size m, we have:
ES [RS(hS)−RD(hS)] = ES [RS(hS)− ES′ [RS′(hS)]]
= ES,S′ [RS(hS)−RS′(hS)]
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Now, consider the set HˆS∪S′. Since S is a subset of S∪S
′ of size |S∪S′|/2, we have by the definition
of the split-sample hypothesis space that hS ∈ HˆS∪S′ . Thus we can upper bound the latter quantity
by taking a supremum over h ∈ HˆS∪S′ :
ES [RS(hS)−RD(hS)] ≤ ES,S′
[
sup
h∈HˆS∪S′
RS(h) −RS′(h)
]
= ES,S′
[
sup
h∈HˆS∪S′
1
m
m∑
t=1
(
r(h, zt)− r(h, z
′
t)
)]
Now observe, that we can rename any sample zt ∈ S to z
′
t and sample z
′
t ∈ S
′ to zt. By doing show
we do not change the distribution. Moreover, we do not change the quantity HS∪S′, since S ∪ S
′ is
invariant to such swaps. Finally, we only change the sign of the quantity (r(h, zt)− r(h, z
′
t)). Thus
if we denote with σt ∈ {−1, 1}, a Rademacher variable, we get the above quantity is equal to:
ES,S′
[
sup
h∈HˆS∪S′
1
m
m∑
t=1
(
r(h, zt)− r(h, z
′
t)
)]
= ES,S′
[
sup
h∈HˆS∪S′
1
m
m∑
t=1
σt
(
r(h, zt)− r(h, z
′
t)
)]
(13)
for any vector σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ {−1, 1}
m. The latter also holds in expectation over σ, where σt
is randomly drawn between {−1, 1} with equal probability. Hence:
ES [RS(hS)−RD(hS)] ≤ ES,S′,σ
[
sup
h∈HˆS∪S′
1
m
m∑
t=1
σt
(
r(h, zt)− r(h, z
′
t)
)]
By splitting the supremma into a positive and negative part and observing that the two expected
quantities are identical, we get:
ES [RS(hS)−RD(hS)] ≤ 2ES,S′,σ
[
sup
h∈HˆS∪S′
1
m
m∑
t=1
σtr(h, zt)
]
= ES,S′
[
R(S, HˆS∪S′)
]
where R(S,H) denotes the Rademacher complexity of a sample S and hypothesis H.
Observe, that the latter theorem is a strengthening of the fact that the Rademacher complexity
upper bounds the generalization error, simply because:
ES,S′
[
R(S, HˆS∪S′)
]
≤ ES,S′ [R(S,H)] = ES [R(S,H)] (14)
Thus if we can bound the Rademacher complexity of H, then the latter lemma gives a bound on the
generalization error. However, the reverse might not be true. Finally, we show our main theorem,
which shows that if the split-sample hypothesis space has small size, then we immediately get a
generalization bound, without the need to further analyze the Rademacher complexity of H.
Theorem 2 (Main Theorem). For any hypothesis space H, and any fixed ERM process, we have:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h) −
√
2 log(τˆH(2m))
m
(15)
Moreover, with probability 1− δ:
RD(hS) ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h) −
1
δ
√
2 log(τˆH(2m))
m
(16)
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Proof. By applying Massart’s lemma (see e.g. [12]) we have that:
R(S, HˆS∪S′) ≤
√
2 log(|HˆS∪S′ |)
m
≤
√
2 log(τˆH(2m))
m
(17)
Combining the above with Lemma 1, yields the first part of the theorem.
Finally, the high probability statement follows from observing that the random variable suph∈H RD(h)−
RD(hS) is non-negative and by applying Markov’s inequality: with probability 1− δ
sup
h∈H
RD(h)−RD(hS) ≤
1
δ
ES
[
sup
h∈H
RD(h)−RD(hS)
]
≤
1
δ
√
2 log(τˆH(2m))
m
(18)
The latter theorem can be trivially extended to the case when r : H × Z → [α, β], leading to a
bound of the form:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h)− (β − α)
√
2 log(τˆH(2m))
m
(19)
We note that unlike the standard Rademacher complexity, which is defined as R(S,H), our
bound, which is based on bounding R(S, HˆS∪S′) for any two datasets S, S
′ of equal size, does not
imply a high probability bound via McDiarmid’s inequality (see e.g. Chapter 26 of [12] of how this
is done for Rademacher complexity analysis), but only via Markov’s inequality. The latter yields a
worse dependence on the confidence δ on the high probability bound of 1/δ, rather than log(1/δ).
The reason for the latter is that the quantity R(S, HˆS∪S′), depends on the sample S, not only in
terms of on which points to evaluate the hypothesis, but also on determining the hypothesis space
HˆS∪S′. Hence, the function:
f(z1, . . . , zm) = ES′

 sup
h∈Hˆ{z1,...,zm}∪S′
1
m
m∑
t=1
σt
(
r(h, zt)− r(h, z
′
t)
) (20)
does not satisfy the stability property that |f(z) − f(z′′i , z−i)| ≤
1
m . The reason being that the
supremum is taken over a different hypothesis space in the two inputs. This is unlike the case of
the function:
f(z1, . . . , zm) = ES′
[
sup
h∈H
1
m
m∑
t=1
σt
(
r(h, zt)− r(h, z
′
t)
)]
(21)
which is used in the standard Rademacher complexity bound analysis, which satisfies the latter
stability property.
3 Sample Complexity of Auctions via Split-Sample Growth
We now present the application of the latter measure of complexity to the analysis of the sample
complexity of revenue optimal auctions. Thoughout this section we assume that the revenue of
any auction lies in the range [0, 1]. The results can be easily adapted to any other range [α, β], by
re-scaling the equations, which will lead to blow-ups in the sample complexity of the order of an
extra (β − α) multiplicative factor. This limits the results here to bounded distributions of values.
However, as was shown in [3], one can always cap the distribution of values up to some upper bound,
for the case of regular distributions, by losing only an ǫ fraction of the revenue. So one can apply
the results below on this capped distribution.
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Single bidder and single item. Consider the case of a single bidder and single item auction. In
this setting, the space of hypothesis is H = {post a reserve price r for r ∈ [0, 1]}. We consider, the
ERM rule, which for any set S, in the case of ties, it favors reserve prices that are equal to some
valuation vt ∈ S. Wlog assume that samples v1, . . . , vm are ordered in increasing order. Observe,
that for any set S, this ERM rule on any subset T of S, will post a reserve price that is equal to
some value vt ∈ T . Any other reserve price in between two values [vt, vt+1] is weakly dominated
by posting r = vt+1, as it does not change which samples are allocated and we can only increase
revenue. Thus the space HˆS is a subset of {post a reserve price r ∈ {v1, . . . , vm}. The latter is of
size m. Thus the split-sample growth of H is τˆH(m) ≤ m. This yields:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h) −
√
2 log(2m)
m
(22)
Equivalently, the sample complexity is mH(ǫ) = O
(
log(1/ǫ)
ǫ2
)
.
Multiple i.i.d. regular bidders and single item. In this case the space of hypotheses are the
space of second price auctions with some reserve r ∈ [0, 1]. Again if we consider ERM which in
case of ties favors a reserve that equals to a value in the sample (assuming that is part of the tied
set, or outputs any other value otherwise), then observe that for any subset T of a sample S, ERM
on that subset will pick a reserve price that is equal to one of the values in the samples S. Thus
τˆH(m) ≤ n ·m. This yields:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h) −
√
2 log(2 · n ·m)
m
(23)
Equivalently, the sample complexity is mH(ǫ) = O
(
log(n/ǫ2)
ǫ2
)
.
Non-i.i.d. regular bidders, single item, second price with player specific reserves. In
this case the space of hypotheses HSP are the space of second price auctions with some reserve
ri ∈ [0, 1] for each player i. Again if we consider ERM which in case of ties favors a reserve that
equals to a value in the sample (assuming that is part of the tied set, or outputs any other value
otherwise), then observe that for any subset T of a sample S, ERM on that subset will pick a
reserve price ri that is equal to one of the values v
i
t of player i in the sample S. There are m such
possible choices for each player, thus mn possible choices of reserves in total. Thus τˆH(m) ≤ m
n.
This yields:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈HSP
RD(h)−
√
2n log(2m)
m
(24)
If H is the space of all dominant strategy truthful mechanisms, then by prophet inequalities (see
[5]), we know that suph∈HSP RD(h) ≥
1
2 suph∈H RD(h). Thus:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥
1
2
sup
h∈H
RD(h) −
√
2n log(2m)
m
(25)
Non-i.i.d. irregular bidders single item. In this case the space of hypotheses are the space of
all virtual welfare maximizing auctions: For each player i, pick a monotone function φˆi(vi) ∈ [−1, 1]
and allocate to the player with the highest non-negative virtual value, charging him the lowest value
6
he could have bid and still win the item. In this case, we will first coarsen the space of all possible
auctions.
In particular, we will consider the class of t-level auctions of [7]. In this class, we constrain the
value functions φˆi(vi) to only take values in the discrete ǫ grid in [0, 1]. We will call this class Hǫ.
An equivalent representation of these auctions is by saying that for each player i, we define a vector
of thresholds 0 = θi0 ≤ θ
i
1 ≤ . . . ≤ θ
i
s ≤ θ
i
s+1 = 1, with s = 1/ǫ. The index of a player is the largest
j for which vi ≥ θj. Then we allocate the item to the player with the highest index (breaking ties
lexicographically) and charge the minimum value he has to bid to continue to win.
Observe that on any sample S of valuation vectors, it is always weakly better to place the
thresholds θij on one of the values in the set S. Any other threshold is weakly dominated, as it does
not change the allocation. Thus for any subset T of a set S of size m, we have that the thresholds
of each player i will take one of the values of player i that appears in set S. We have 1/ǫ thresholds
for each player, hence m1/ǫ combinations of thresholds for each player and mn/ǫ combinations of
thresholds for all players. Thus τˆH(m) ≤ m
n/ǫ. This yields:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈Hǫ
RD(h)−
√
2n log(2m)
ǫ ·m
(26)
Moreover, by [7] we also have that:
sup
h∈Hǫ
RD(h) ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h)− ǫ (27)
Picking, ǫ =
(
2n log(2m)
m
)1/3
, we get:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥ sup
h∈H
RD(h) − 2
(
2n log(2m)
m
)1/3
(28)
Equivalently, the sample complexity is mH(ǫ) = O
(
n log(1/ǫ)
ǫ3
)
.
k items, n bidders, additive valuations, grand bundle pricing. If the reserve price was
anonymous, then the reserve price output by ERM on any subset of a sample S of size m, will take
the value of one of the m total values for the items of the buyers in S. So τˆH(m) = m · n. If the
reserve price was not anonymous, then for each buyer ERM will pick one of the m total item values,
so τˆH(m) ≤ m
n. Thus the sample complexity is mH(ǫ) = O
(
n log(1/ǫ)
ǫ2
)
.
k items, n bidders, additive valuations, item prices. If reserve prices are anonymous, then
each reserve price on item j computed by ERM on any subset of a sample S of size m, will take the
value of one of the player’s values for item j, i.e. n ·m. So τˆH(m) = (n ·m)
k. If reserve prices are
not anonymous, then the reserve price on item j for player i will take the value of one of the player’s
values for the item. So τˆH(m) ≤ m
n·k. Thus the sample complexity is mH(ǫ) = O
(
nk log(1/ǫ)
ǫ2
)
.
k items, n bidders, additive valuations, best of grand bundle pricing and item pricing.
ERM on the combination will take values on any subset of a sample S of size m, that is at most
the product of the values of each of the classes (bundle or item pricing). Thus, for anonymous
pricing: τˆH(m) = (m · n)
k+1 and for non-anonymous pricing: τˆH(m) ≤ m
n(k+1). Thus the sample
complexity is mH(ǫ) = O
(
n(k+1) log(1/ǫ)
ǫ2
)
.
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In the case of a single bidder, we know that the best of bundle pricing or item pricing is a 1/8
approximation to the overall best truthful mechanism for the true distribution of values, assuming
values for each item are drawn independently. Thus in the latter case we have:
ES [RD(hS)] ≥
1
6
sup
h∈H
RD(h)−
√
2(k + 1) log(2m)
m
(29)
where H is the class of all truthful mechanisms.
Comparison with [8]. The latter three applications were analyzed by [8], via the notion of the
pseudo-dimension, but their results lead to sample complexity bounds of O(nk log(nk) log(1/ǫ)ǫ2 ). Thus
the above simpler analysis removes the extra log factor on the dependence.
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